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You get what you (don’t) pay for: The impact of 
volunteer labour and candidate spending at the 
2010 British General Election.1 
 
 
There is now a large body or research which demonstrates over a series of elections that 
campaigning at district (constituency) level in Britain can produce electoral payoffs (Clarke, 
Sanders, Stewart & Whiteley, 2004, 2009; Whiteley & Seyd, 1994; Pattie, Johnston & 
Fieldhouse, 1995; Denver & Hands, 1997; Denver, Hands, Fisher & McAllister, 2003; 
Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Fisher, Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011). The level of payoffs varies. For 
example, Fisher, Cutts and Fieldhouse (2011) show that there are four key variables 
exogenous to a constituency which impact upon the effectiveness of campaigning: the 
closeness of the election at national level, the likelihood of a significant change in parties’ 
standing, the number of target seats, and the extent to which central parties have clear 
objectives in respect of their campaign management. Equally, Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse 
(1995) have shown that the effectiveness of candidate campaign spending varies depending 
upon whether a candidate is an incumbent or a challenger, reflecting the work of Gary 
Jacobson (1980) in the United States, and Pattie and Johnston (2009) have shown that the 
payoffs are less for government parties than for their opponents. Overall, however, different 
research teams, using different data have arrived at broadly the same conclusion – 
campaigning at the district level can influence electoral outcomes. 
 
The two principal approaches to the measurement of campaign intensity as a means to 
assess electoral effects use different data sources, which are brought together for this 
article. The first uses candidate spending data as a surrogate for campaign intensity.2 The 
second employs a survey of election agents3 designed to capture the many different aspects 
of campaigns: preparation, organisation, manpower, use of computers, polling day activity, 
use of telephones, use of direct mail, canvassing, use of leaflets and e-campaigning (Fisher, 
Cutts & Fieldhouse, 2011: 827). Critically, this includes both campaign techniques that incur 
financial cost, but also those that are provided free by volunteers. Both approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages. The agent survey is a much more direct measure of 
campaign intensity than campaign spending, and captures a very wide range of activities. 
                                                
1  Research for this article was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. Grant Number RES-000-22-2762. 
This support is gratefully acknowledged. 
2   Candidate spending in Britain is limited by law and that limit varies by the electorate and geography of the constituency. 
Thus, the appropriate measurement of candidate spending is not the total expenditure, but the percentage of the 
maximum permitted. 
3   All candidates are legally obliged to retain an election agent. The agent is responsible for the organisation and conduct of 
the campaign. This survey is sent to election agents of all candidates in Great Britain from the Conservative Party, the 
Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party standing for election to the Westminster Parliament. 
Page | 2  
 
However, it is potentially limited by response rates. That said, the 2010 survey solicited a 
very respectable response rate of 54%. And the responses to the survey were in fact 
strongly representative, both in terms of the electoral status of the seats and when 
comparing them with the percentage of maximum spend by candidates during the regulated 
‘long’ and ‘short’ campaigns  – see Appendix (Tables A1 and A2). The analysis of candidate 
spending is not constrained by response rates. Declaration of spending is required by law 
and the returns are published by the Electoral Commission. Thus, near complete spending 
data are available for almost all candidates across a long run of elections. However, 
campaign spending focuses on the material aspects of the campaign (most money is spent 
on printed material such as leaflets), and cannot properly capture volunteer effort. 
Notwithstanding, previous studies (Denver and Hands, 1997; Johnston and Pattie, 2006) 
have shown a fairly strong relationship between the level of candidate spending and the 
wider level of campaign intensity (as captured through the survey). And Fieldhouse and 
Cutts (2008) show that in 2005, both spending and the agent survey intensity index tapped 
the same underlying latent construct or campaign effort.  In 2010, spending again correlated 
with overall campaign intensity, but not perhaps as strongly as one might expect. For 
example, correlating the candidate expenditure over the period from the dissolution of 
parliament to polling day (the ‘short campaign’) with overall campaign intensity produces 
correlation coefficients (r) of 0.618, 0.732 and 0.716 for the Conservatives, Labour and 
Liberal Democrats respectively. Candidate spending captures a significant proportion of 
campaign intensity, but clearly not all of it. 
 
Candidate Spending 
The fact that candidate spending fails to capture a significant proportion of campaign efforts 
matters not only in academic terms, but also in regulatory ones. Candidate expenditure has 
been limited by law in Britain since 1883 – a move designed both to limit any potential 
electoral benefit arising from a larger financial endowment and also to limit the cost of 
elections themselves (Clift & Fisher, 2004). However, despite this longstanding regulation, 
significant concerns have been raised in recent years about the electoral impact of spending 
outside the regulatory period. Johnston and Pattie (2007) have shown, for example, that 
Conservative spending at district level in advance of the 2005 election did indeed yield 
electoral payoffs, while more recent work by Cutts, Johnston, Pattie and Fisher (2012) 
shows that this was also the case in 2010. As a result of such concerns, the regulated period 
was extended in the 2010 election. In addition to the period from dissolution to polling day (a 
period of between 3-6 weeks at recent elections) – the ‘short campaign’ – legislation 
introduced in 2009 introduced a second regulated period of limited candidate spending – 
from January 1st 2010 to the dissolution (a period of just over three months): the ‘long 
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campaign’. Despite this introduction, concerns have remained about the ability of the 
currently financially dominant Conservatives to gain an electoral advantage on account of 
their greater spending power. Table 1 illustrates the Conservatives’ advantage. On average, 
Conservative candidates were able to spend 66.7% of the legal maximum in the short 
campaign period, compared with 51% and 37.4% for Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
respectively. Combining the spending in both regulated periods (the long and the short 
campaign) again shows a fairly substantial Conservative advantage. 
 
Table 1. Mean Maximum of Permitted Candidate Expenditure in 2010 (n=621) 
% Conservative Labour Lib Dems 
Short Campaign 66.7 51.0 37.4 
Short + Long Campaign 38.2 25.6 19.6 
 
However, despite the Conservative financial advantage overall, the electoral advantages 
were less clear cut. At both national and district levels, the extra spending power was not 
matched by electoral gains to the same degree (Fisher, 2010; Johnston et al, Forthcoming). 
What accounts for this apparent anomaly? First, of course, it could be that the Conservatives 
spent their money unwisely and that other parties targeted resources more effectively. One 
way to test this is to assess the level of spending depending upon the electoral status of a 
seat. Although the unit of analysis is campaigning at the district level, all parties seek to 
coordinate their district level campaigns from the centre. This level of centralisation has been 
increasing over time (Fisher & Denver, 2008) and has yielded electoral payoffs (Fisher, 
Denver & Hands, 2006). Thus, central parties designate whether or not seats are targets. 
This exercise is more than cosmetic. Target seats receive more in the way of assistance 
from the central party, through the provision, for example, of staff and also through 
telephone and direct mail campaigning run from the centre. 
 
As a result of such coordination, broadly speaking, we would expect a party's national and 
regional organisations to ensure that their local parties - which are responsible for raising 
almost all of the money spent on the constituency campaigns - to be more active raising 
funds in their target seats (seats which it was seeking to gain, or its own seats which the 
party regarded as being vulnerable) and least in the seats where it had no chance of 
winning. In seats which a party holds, but where there is little chance of defeat, we would 
expect levels of spending to be somewhere in between.4 Table 2 examines whether this is 
                                                
4  In 2010, the context for designating target seats was a little uncertain on account of extensive boundary reviews in 
England and Wales following the 2005 election.  Thus, both parties and indeed academics made use of notional results in 
England & Wales for 2005. 
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the case.5 As we can see, the patterns of candidate spending were much as predicted with 
the Conservatives on average outspending their two opponents in all seat categories both in 
the short campaign and in the two campaigns combined. The only particular surprise is that 
Conservative spending was relatively high in both its safe seats (labelled Held Not Target) 
and in seats where the party had very little chance of electoral success (labelled Not Held 
Not Target). This relative lack of differentiation is a function in part of this three-category 
table. The categories do not, for example, discriminate between degrees of marginality 
within the categories, and Johnston et al (Forthcoming) show that there is a clear 
relationship between marginality and levels of spending. However, the central parties’ target 
lists do not tally entirely with marginality (though there is a link). Thus, while the table may 
understate the differentiation between categories a little, the central point remains that the 
differentiation between targets and non-targets for the Conservatives was weaker than might 
have been expected. 
 
Table 2. Candidate Spending by Electoral Status (n=621) 
Short (Short + Long) Held Not Target Target 
Not Held 
Not Target 
Conservative 78.4 (39.1) 88.7 (64.2) 44.1 (21.4) 
Labour 65.7 (27.9) 78.9 (51.1) 23.7   (9.7) 
Liberal Democrat n/a 88.7 (63.2) 27.7 (11.4) 
 
Note 1: Figures represent the percentage spent of the maximum permitted expenditure 
 
A second possibility is that, overall, parties’ campaigns were differentially effective on 
account of campaign management. These were the conclusions of Fisher, Cutts and 
Fieldhouse (2011), who show that despite the exogenous contextual circumstances being 
unfavourable to Labour, the party was successful in boosting its vote through campaigning 
by having clear objectives about the desired outcome of the election. Labour knew it was 
likely to lose, so its strategy was to minimize Conservative gains in order to deny the party a 
parliamentary majority. This entailed effectively sacrificing some seats won by only small 
margins in 2005, which were likely to be won by the Conservatives in 2010, in order to focus 
resources to those seats that, if held, would deny the Conservatives a majority. By way of 
contrast, the Conservatives focussed too much attention on seats that the party would win 
anyway. 
 
                                                
5  Seat categories in terms of electoral status are determined by the central parties. Thus, in the 2010 election, all existing 
Liberal Democrat seats were regarded as targets. As a result, there are no seats in the Held Not Target category. 
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A third possibility is that candidate expenditure does not capture all the key aspects of 
campaigning sufficiently well. A reliance on this measure alone as an indicator of campaign 
intensity therefore has the potential to generate a misleading picture. To be sure, many 
aspects of campaigning do require expenditure (notably on the printing of leaflets, posters 
and other media which is what the bulk of the reported expenditure goes on: Johnston et al, 
2011), and these will be captured by candidate spending. But given that many aspects of 
campaigning rely on labour and cannot legally be undertaken by paid staff, but can be 
carried out by unpaid volunteers, there is the possibility that parties can counteract the 
effects of differential wealth through the efforts of unpaid volunteers engaged in a whole 
range of activities including canvassing, and polling day activities such as ‘knocking-up’ to 
ensure that a party’s identified supporters remember to vote. Again, the effectiveness of 
these activities will depend both on their aggregate levels, and how efficiently the efforts of 
volunteers are distributed. This then, is the focus of this article. To what extent does ‘free 
campaigning’, independent of that which incurs cost, make a separate contribution to parties’ 
electoral performance at the district level? 
 
Free Campaigning 
The survey of election agents provides some useful data with which to address this issue, 
featuring three questions which broadly capture the ‘free’ aspects of election campaigns. 
They cover: the proportion of the electorate canvassed on the doorstep during a campaign; 
the proportion of the constituency covered by volunteers staffing polling stations to take 
details of who had voted; and the number of polling day workers. Table 3 illustrates the 
relative strength of each party in respect of these free activities. Across every indicator, the 
Conservatives had a significant advantage – double that of their competitors in some 
instances. However, as with any resource, the aggregate total only tells us so much. What is 
more important is where that resource is utilised and how effectively. 
 
Table 3.  Mean Free Campaign Indicators by Party 
 Conservative Labour Lib Dems 
% Electorate Canvassed 26 16 10 
% of Constituency covered by number takers 33 16 17 
No. of Polling Day Workers 88 42 46 
N 287 388 353 
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To get a better indication of the distribution of ‘free’ campaign effort, it is more useful to 
produce a scale of the above items. This is done through Principal Components Analysis.6 
All three variables load on a single factor as one might expect (for the full solution, see 
Appendix Table A3). These scores were then standardised around a mean of 100 to permit 
ease of interpretation.  
 
Table 4 illustrates the distribution of free resources by the electoral status of the seat. Here, 
we might expect a more efficient distribution of effort than is the case with candidate 
spending as the amount of volunteer activity is not capped. However, often frustratingly for 
parties, human resources may actually be less mobile than financial ones (Fisher & Denver, 
2008). And so the picture is mixed. On the one hand, the level of free campaigning in seats 
where a party is unlikely to make an electoral breakthrough (Not Held Not Target) is 
evidently much lower than in other seats for all parties. On the other hand, however, the 
differentiation in intensity between target seats and those that are ‘safe’ (Held Not Target) is 
tiny. Political circumstances may explain this a little in the case of the Labour Party. The 
party was unpopular and defending gains won after three election victories. In that sense, 
safe seats may not have been perceived as such by those offering the free effort.  
 
In the case of the Conservative Party, however, the lack of differentiation is more difficult to 
explain, particularly given its relative popularity prior to the election. Yet it may reflect a 
longer term problem in the party, whereby electoral efforts are often misdirected at safer 
seats – especially where the central party is unable to deploy resources more effectively. 
Overall, then, the Conservatives enjoyed the highest level of free campaigning, but that 
advantage was tempered through strong targeting by the Liberal Democrats and, to an 
extent, seemingly excessive effort by the Conservatives in their safe seats. Of course, strong 
efforts in safe seats would be unlikely to damage the Conservative cause, but would 
represent a missed opportunity to focus efforts more effectively given the limited resources 
available, overall. 
 
Table 4. Mean Free Campaigning Effort by Electoral Status 
 All Held Not Target Target 
Not Held 
Not Target 
Conservative (n=287) 118 132 135 96 
Labour (n=388) 95 108 109 80 
Liberal Democrat (n=353) 92 n/a 128 86 
                                                
6  Where there were missing data on individual variables that formed part of these scales, multiple imputation was used, 
which took account of the individual party and the target status of the seat. 
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The Electoral Impact 
To assess the relative electoral impact of candidate spending and free district level 
campaigning, we include both candidate spending data and the free campaigning index from 
the election agent survey in a single analysis. We create a model which regresses the 
impact of these two variables on the share of the vote in 2010, while controlling for the share 
of that party’s vote in 20057 and whether the party was fielding an incumbent candidate. 
Controlling for previous vote share through the use of a lagged endogenous variable is a 
widely used technique which introduces a dynamic specification into the model. The 
approach has a number of advantages. First, it allows us to capture factors affecting the 
change in electoral performance which is a much more meaningful gauge of effectiveness 
than simple 2010 vote share. Second, it captures the effect of a variety of other factors which 
are correlated with the underlying level of performance of each party (such as the 
demographic profile of the electorate). Third, it captures the effects of previous campaigns at 
earlier elections. In sum, though we are not concerned with the value of the lagged 
endogenous variable itself, its use generates a more conservative picture of any campaign 
effects. We also control for personal incumbency as there is ample evidence to suggest that 
this had an independent impact at in 2010 (Johnston et al., Forthcoming). The inclusion of 
vote share at the previous election not surprisingly has a significant and very substantial 
effect on model fit because the geography of voting for a party tends to be consistent across 
a series of elections, varying only in its relative topography. But it also serves to illustrate 
that where effects are found, they are likely to be robust. We operationalize our model using 
OLS.  
 
The first analysis (Table 5) uses candidate spending during the short campaign period, while 
the second (Table 6) uses the aggregate expenditure of candidates over the whole regulated 
period (long plus short campaigns). In both, we are seeking, first, to assess if candidate 
spending and free district campaigning each have independent effects. If they do, it suggests 
that factors not captured by candidate spending have electoral effects. If that is the case, it 
would suggest that disparities in spending can be offset to a degree by the level of free 
campaigning. And, if both candidate spending and free campaigning have independent 
effects, we can then compare their relative effects using the standardized beta coefficients.  
 
The results vary across the three parties. In the case of the Conservatives, the findings are 
clear. Candidate spending over both regulated periods yielded electoral payoffs, while free 
                                                
7  This analysis, like all of the others reported here, excludes the 18 Northern Ireland constituencies plus that being defended 
by the Speaker (where the parties traditionally do not field candidates) and Thirsk & Malton, where the election was held 
later (under different spending limits) because of the death of a candidate during the short campaign period. Boundary 
revisions took place in England and Wales between 2005 and 2010, so these are notional 2005 vote shares in England 
and Wales, but not in Scotland, where the boundaries were unchanged. 
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campaigning had no impact in either model. This may be surprising in one sense – after all, 
the Conservatives had the highest levels of free campaigning overall and the highest levels 
in target seats. However, the relative lack of impact may be explained first by relatively poor 
targeting. Thus, while the Conservatives had strong levels of free campaigning in target 
seats, the same was also true in their safe seats. As a result, the overall effectiveness of 
their free campaigning will have been suppressed as any gains that would have been made 
in safe seats (particularly with that party being relatively popular) would be marginal. 
Second, of course, the data suggest that the impact of candidate spending was so great that 
any effects of free campaigning were significantly diminished.  
 
In the case of Labour, the position is effectively reversed. Comparing free campaigning with 
candidate spending during the ‘short campaign’ (Table 5), we find that both had a statistically 
significant impact on share of the vote, though spending only just reaches statistical 
significance. This, along with the standardized beta coefficients, suggests that free 
campaigning had a stronger effect. This is amplified when we look at spending over the 
entire regulated period (Table 6). Here, candidate spending had no statistically significant 
impact, while free campaigning continued to do so. Labour, of course, spent considerably 
less than the Conservatives (see Table 1), but what is apparent is that free campaigning 
appears to have compensated to some extent. The impact is confirmed when we compare 
the models first by including spending alone, and then by adding free campaigning. In both 
cases, F-Tests confirm that the addition of free campaigning produces a statistically 
significant improvement in model fit. 
 
Analysis of the Liberal Democrats also produces some interesting results. Again, both 
candidate spending and free campaigning had statistically significant effects (and in this 
case for both the short campaign and the full regulated period). And, as with Labour, F-Tests 
confirm the statistically significant improvement in the models generated by the inclusion of 
free campaigning. However, the order of the effects is perhaps unexpected. The Liberal 
Democrats have traditionally had significantly less money to spend and have relied on well-
targeted efforts by grass roots activists (Cutts, 2006; Cutts & Shryane, 2006). We might 
expect, therefore, that the effects of free campaigning would be stronger than candidate 
spending. In fact, the reverse is true. The beta coefficients indicate that candidate spending 
had the stronger effect on Liberal Democrat vote share. Given that the Liberal Democrats 
spent substantially less than the Conservatives and somewhat less than Labour (see Table 
1), the puzzle is why this occurred. The likely answer is effective targeting. As Table 2 
shows, Liberal Democrat candidate spending in their target seats was broadly comparable 
with that of Conservative candidates in that party’s targets. The Liberal Democrats had less 
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money overall, but candidate spend was distributed very effectively. Of course, free 
campaigning by the Liberal Democrats was also effective. But once again, it was well 
targeted. As Table 4 shows, free campaigning by the Liberal Democrats in target seats was 
broadly comparable with that of the Conservatives too. 
 
Of course, it is very likely to be the case that high levels of free activity in a constituency are 
associated with high levels of spending (and vice versa), suggesting possible problems with 
collinearity. Certainly, the index of free campaigning correlates positively with the levels of 
spending for all three parties, though not perhaps as strongly as we might expect.8 Thus, to 
confirm the robust nature of our findings, we regressed levels of free activity on candidate 
spending during the short campaign and during the whole regulated period. From this we 
took standardized residuals for each as measures of free campaigning independent of 
spending. We then re-ran the regression models using these standardised residuals instead 
of the normal indicator of free campaigning. The results are shown in the Appendix (Tables 
A4 and A5) and confirm the broad findings in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
Table 5. The Electoral Impact of Candidate Spending and Free District Campaigning (Short Campaign Spend) 
 Conservative
(n=281) 
Labour
(n=384) 
Lib Dem 
(n=347) 
 b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig 
Constant 2.741 .646  ** -8.175 1.004  ** 2.889 .848  ** 
Vote 2005 .966 .022 .925 ** .872 .023 .840 ** .662 .036 .658 ** 
Incumbent .932 .558 .029 n.s. 2.270 .689 .066 ** 3.553 .994 .097 ** 
Free Campaigning .001 .005 .002 n.s. .046 .011 .079 ** .036 .010 .095 ** 
Candidate Spending .028 .009 .054 ** .025 .012 .047 * .060 .010 .184 ** 
Adj. R2    .955    .907    .864 
 
Note: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, n.s. Not statistically significant 
 
  
                                                
8  The correlations between free campaigning and the regulated spending periods (Short and Short Plus Long) are: .470 and 
.464 for the Conservatives; .585 and .526 for Labour; and .555 and .585 for the Liberal Democrats, so little more than, at 
most, one-third of the variation in free campaigning can be associated with that in spending. Scatter-plots show that in 
general for all three parties constituencies with low spending levels also have low values on each of the free campaigning 
variables but there is much greater variation in the amounts of free campaigning mobilised in seats where spending levels 
are above average. 
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Table 6. The Electoral Impact of Candidate Spending and Free District Campaigning (Short + Long Campaign 
Spend) 
 Conservative
(n=281) 
Labour
(n=384) 
Lib Dem 
(n=347) 
 b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig 
Constant 3.317 .636  ** -8.456 1.007  ** 3.681 .884  ** 
Vote 2005 .969 .021 .928 ** .887 .022 .854 ** .665 .035 .660 ** 
Incumbent 1.408 .581 .044 * 2.441 .689 .071 ** 3.061 .985 .083 ** 
Free Campaigning -.002 .006 -.005 n.s. .051 .011 .088 ** .033 .010 .087 ** 
Candidate Spending .037 .009 .062 ** .015 .016 .018 n.s. .090 .014 .196 ** 
Adj. R2    .956    .906    .865 
 
Note: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 n.s. Not statistically significant 
 
The models reported in tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that campaign effort (indexed by both 
candidate spending and our ‘free campaign’ measure) does boost vote share. But can it do 
so sufficiently to change the pattern of party representation in Parliament (the parties’ 
ultimate aim)? We can gain some idea by using the models to simulate election outcomes 
under different party campaigning assumptions. For both sets of models, we look at six 
different scenarios. In the first three scenarios, we assume that in every constituency all 
three parties’ ‘free campaign’ efforts are at the same level as each party’s least active 
constituency campaign in 2010, and we further assume that two of the three party 
candidates spend nothing on any of their constituency campaigns while the remaining party 
candidates spends 100% of their legal allowance in every seat. In the final three scenarios, 
we assume that the party candidates spend nothing on their campaigns anywhere, and that 
two of the three parties  run ‘free campaigns’ in all seats at the level of their least active free 
campaign in 2010, while the remaining party’s free campaign is at the level of its most active 
2010 constituency campaign.  
 
For each scenario, we estimate the parties’ vote shares in every constituency, and hence the 
likely outcome in seats (Table 7). While somewhat extreme, in that each scenario assumes 
one party runs a full-tilt campaign everywhere, while its rivals make minimal efforts, this does 
give some impression of the range of likely effects. And they can be substantial. For 
instance, had Conservative candidates spent up to the limit everywhere in the short 
campaign while facing minimal campaigns from their rivals, the models predict they would 
have won 337 seats in 2010 to Labour’s 244 and the Liberal Democrats’ 39 (enough for a 
Parliamentary majority). But had Labour candidates been the party spending up to the limit 
everywhere while its rivals remained quiescent, the party could, despite its national 
unpopularity, have hoped to draw almost even with the Conservatives in MPs elected, 
gaining 286 seats to the latter’s 288. The simulations also show that the potential effects of 
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‘combined’ long and short campaign spending on the distribution of seats was larger than 
those for short campaign spending alone, and that the effects of going from the least active 
‘free campaign’ everywhere to the most active were greater than the effects of going from 
spending nothing to spending up to the hilt. This latter finding is particularly striking, as it 
suggests voluntary (and largely face-to-face) activity has greater campaign potential than 
money alone (which mainly contributes to more impersonal forms of campaigning, such as 
leafleting). Parties neglect their grassroots at their peril, and concentrating on building strong 
local networks of active members and supporters9 may yield greater electoral dividends than 
ensuring well-funded constituency campaigns alone. 
 
 
Table 7. Predicting the effects of local campaigning on seat distributions 
 
Scenario Con spend 
100% 
Lab spend 
100% 
LD spend 
100% 
Con max. 
free 
campaign 
Lab max. free 
campaign 
LD max. free 
campaign 
‘Short campaign spend’ Models: Seats 
Conservative 337 288 293 308 237 290 
Labour 244 286 259 265 342 259 
Lib Dem 39 46 68 47 42 71 
       
‘Combined campaign spend’ Models: Seats 
Conservative 344 292 285 298 231 293 
Labour 240 282 252 273 350 261 
Lib Dem 37 46 83 49 40 66 
       
 
 
 
Overall, these analyses suggest that candidate spending as a measure of campaign 
intensity is a very useful surrogate measure. But it does not capture a significant aspect of 
campaigns – that provided free through voluntary labour. And, most critically, for Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats where free campaigning was substantial in 2010 it had significant 
electoral effects, independent of candidate spending. These findings are not an isolated 
example. Using a different measure of campaign spending, Fisher (2011) shows that free 
campaigning has had independent effects for these two parties in most elections from 1992-
2005. The implications here are clear. To be sure, the Conservatives enjoyed a significant 
financial advantage over their rivals in terms of candidate spending and were successful to a 
degree in exploiting that advantage. However, the advantages enjoyed by the Conservatives 
were offset in part by the impact of free campaigning by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
 
However, the results in Tables 5-6 do not paint an entirely full picture since, of course, 
campaigns do not occur in isolation – other parties are also campaigning in constituencies. 
                                                
9  Fisher, Fieldhouse and Cutts (Forthcoming) show that parties rely not only on members for their voluntary labour, but 
also supporters (who are not members). Indeed, some 78% of Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats recruited 
supporters to assist with their campaigns at the 2010 Election. 
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Thus, the optimal outcome of any one party’s campaign is not only to enhance its share of 
the vote, but also to damage that of other parties. A further analysis is therefore required, 
which includes constituencies where we have free campaigning scores and candidate 
spending data for all three parties. Inevitably, this results in a significant reduction in the 
number of available cases and so it is here, where we have only 98 of the 630 
constituencies with full data on candidate spending and levels of free campaigning for the 
Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This reduction in the number of cases 
means that the analysis we conduct should inevitably be treated with some caution. 
However, the results discussed and shown in the Appendix (Tables A6 and A7) continue to 
support the findings that free campaigning produces independent electoral payoffs and that 
candidate spending does not tell the whole story when examining campaign effectiveness 
 
Conclusions 
Measuring the intensity of constituency campaigns at British general elections in order to 
assess their electoral impact has become increasingly sophisticated, with multiple sources of 
data employed. The result has been that researchers can illustrate very clearly that 
campaigns can boost electoral performance, but that effective management of these 
campaigns is essential to maximise their impact. Inevitably, any measure will not capture all 
of the effects. The survey of election agents has difficulty capturing efforts more than a year 
prior to polling day (and there is plentiful evidence that a significant amount of activity takes 
place before then), while the analysis of candidate spending can only focus on spending 
during regulated periods when candidates are required to file a return. Nevertheless, the 
various sources of data present a convincing case that spending and other 
canvassing/campaigning activities during the period immediately preceding an election can 
make a substantial impact on a party’s performance. By combining data (as we do in this 
article), we are therefore in a position to make a good assessment about the extent to which 
the level of spending by a candidate is core to understanding his or her electoral 
performance. Of course, no one could fight an election without money, nor with a trifling sum 
– it is very clear empirically that even the most token campaigns require some expenditure 
and that broadly speaking, better funded campaigns have strong potential to deliver electoral 
payoffs and indeed do so. 
 
However, what this article shows is that level of spending does not capture all campaign 
effects, and that free volunteer labour can also have a significant impact (see also Fisher, 
Fieldhouse & Cutts, Forthcoming). As we see in the cases of Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats, their financial disadvantage relative to the Conservatives was offset somewhat 
by both effective management of their resources though targeting, but also by the level of 
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free campaigning. Somewhat intriguingly, this was not the case for the Conservatives. But 
this result may tell us more about the continuing relative inability of that party to direct 
resources at local level effectively, than about the nature of Conservative free campaigning. 
In essence, money matters and better financially endowed candidates will generally perform 
better electorally. Even so, it is apparent from this article that a party can compensate for its 
relative poverty to an extent, through well targeted and well managed free campaign activity.  
 
Such conclusions may give cause for cautious optimism to those concerned that election 
outcomes can be unduly influenced by financial disparity, since better financial endowment 
may not be automatically beneficial in electoral terms. But they also have regulatory 
implications. As we show earlier in the article, concern about the distorting effects of 
candidate spending have prompted an extension of the regulated period of spending for 
candidates. And indeed, Labour has previously called for the regulated period to be 
analogous to that at national level (which is currently 365 days), if not longer. Yet, if 
candidate expenditure can be offset to an extent by free volunteer labour (which presumably 
would be something that a democracy would wish to encourage), there might be a case for 
rejecting such calls for an extended regulatory period, or even reducing the current one 
given that even in target seats, candidates did not, on average, come anywhere near to the 
spending cap (see Table 2). However, an alternative view would be that although spending 
can be offset by free campaigning, there is no guarantee that this will always be the case – 
especially where parties have limited manpower. Thus, it makes sense to continue to 
regulate as we currently do, but perhaps treat any proposals for extension more cautiously, 
given the costs of compliance for what are still voluntary organisations. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Responses 
The numbers of responses for each party in the agent survey by target status were as 
follows: 
 
 All Held Not Target Target No Target Not Held 
Conservative 287 120 56 111 
Labour 388 128 75 185 
Liberal Democrat 353 * 50 303 
 
Table A2: Mean Percentage of Maximum Spend by Responses During Long and Short 
Campaigns 
 
% Respondents All Constiuencies 
Conservative 37.2 38.1 
Labour 22.5 25.6 
Liberal Democrat 18.8 19.6 
 
Table A3. Principal Components Analysis of Free Campaigning Index  
 Component 
% of Electorate Canvassed .705 
% of Constituency Covered by Number Takers .845 
No. of Polling Day Workers .826 
 
Note: After Varimax Rotation. 1 Component Extracted 
 
 
Table A4. The Electoral Impact of Candidate Spending and Free District Campaigning (Short Campaign Spend) 
(Residual Analysis) 
 Conservative
(n=281) 
Labour
(n=384) 
Lib Dem 
(n=347) 
 b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig 
Constant 2.789 .562  ** -4.988 .673  ** 5.522 .620  ** 
Vote 2005 .966 .022 .925 ** .872 .023 .840 ** .662 .036 .658 ** 
Incumbent .932 .558 .029 n.s. 2.270 .689 .066 ** 3.553 .994 .097 ** 
Free Campaigning .023 .196 .002 n.s. 1.046 .260 .064 ** .830 .224 .079 ** 
Candidate Spending .029 .008 .055 ** .049 .011 .093 ** .077 .010 .236 ** 
Adj. R2    .955    .907    .864 
 
Note: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, n.s. Not statistically significant 
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Table A5. The Electoral Impact of Candidate Spending and Free District Campaigning (Short + Long Campaign 
Spend) (Residual Analysis) 
 Conservative
(n=281) 
Labour
(n=384) 
Lib Dem 
(n=347) 
 b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig b Std 
Error 
Beta Sig 
Constant 3.139 .541  ** -4.451 .684  ** 6.235 .645  ** 
Vote 2005 .969 .021 .928 ** .887 .022 .854 ** .665 .035 .660 ** 
Incumbent 1.408 .581 .044 * 2.441 .689 .071 ** 3.061 .985 .083 ** 
Free Campaigning -.071 .199 -.005 n.s 1.232 .270 .075 ** .741 .220 .071 ** 
Candidate Spending .036 .009 .060 ** .053 .015 .064 ** .113 .014 .247 ** 
Adj. R2    .956    .906    .865 
 
Note: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, n.s. Not statistically significant 
 
Multi-Party Models 
When considering the potential negative effects of opponents’ campaigning alongside the 
positive ones, a different methodological approach is required. For our single party analyses, 
we used OLS regression. However, this technique is less suitable in analysing vote shares in 
multiparty elections – in such analyses, OLS has a number of flaws. For instance, it 
assumes that the vote share for each party is independent of the shares for the other parties. 
Yet, of course, that is not the case. If the vote share for Labour goes up, that of other parties 
must go down. OLS regression predictions are also unbounded which means that a model 
could theoretically predict a negative vote share or a vote share greater than 100 per cent. 
For these reasons, a number of scholars have used Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
to account for the properties of multiparty vote share data (Tomz et al, 2002; Katz and King, 
1999; Cutts and Shryane, 2006; Cutts, 2006; Pattie & Johnston, 2009, Fisher, Cutts & 
Fieldhouse, 2011). In order to overcome the problem of unbounded predicted values, 2010 
vote shares were converted into vote share ratios between parties using a logistic 
transformation.  
 
SUR models are, therefore, constructed to examine the impact of candidate spending and 
free campaigning on party support in 2010. The first model focuses on campaigning during 
the short campaign period. The second model uses aggregate candidate expenditure (long 
plus short campaigns). In both analyses, Labour is used as the reference alternative and the 
natural log of the vote share ratio between it and the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats is taken. For completeness, we also examine the impact of candidate spending, 
incumbency and free campaigning (independent of spending produced through the residuals 
analysis above) on the Liberal Democrat-Conservative 2010 vote ratio, where the 
Conservatives are the denominator in the ratio-dependent variable. Where a party is the 
denominator in the ratio (Labour in the first two cases and the Conservatives in the last 
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case), negative values of the vote share ratio reflect a relatively better performance for it 
compared with the other party.  
 
Table A6 shows the impact of candidate spending and free campaigning (independent of 
spending as per the residual analyses in Tables A4 and A5) during the short campaign on 
the 2010 vote share ratios described above. Both equations also include control variables to 
account for where each party stood an incumbent candidate. All models have a high 
goodness of fit (R2), while the Breusch-Pagan test, which checks whether residuals were 
uncorrelated across equations, is highly significant.10 In the first two equations, Labour is the 
denominator in the ratio-dependent variable. Against both the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats, Labour did better where they spent more money during the short campaign 
period. This was offset somewhat by both the other main parties’ spending. When compared 
against Labour, both Conservative and Liberal Democrat candidate spending improved both 
parties’ electoral performance. While spending mattered, Labour’s level of free campaigning 
did not have a significant effect on its relative vote share. By way of contrast, both the 
Conservatives and particularly the Liberal Democrats did better against Labour where they 
ran intensive free campaigns. In the third equation, negative coefficients indicate an increase 
in the Conservative vote compared with the Liberal Democrats because Conservative vote 
share is the denominator in the ratio-dependent variable. When compared against the Liberal 
Democrats, both Conservative candidate spending and free campaigning had a significant 
positive impact on the Conservative vote. Yet this was somewhat offset by the Liberal 
Democrats’ campaigning. Their relative vote share also increased where the candidate spent 
more and had stronger free campaigns. 
 
In Table A7, we use candidate spending over both regulated periods (the long and short 
campaigns). Many of the findings revealed in the previous model hold here too. All parties 
benefited where candidates spent more money. The main difference is the effect of parties’ 
free campaigning. Compared with the Conservatives, Labour free campaigning continued to 
have no significant effect on party performance. Yet, the Conservatives did benefit, not only 
from their own intensive free campaigning, but also from that of the Liberal Democrats. 
However, against the Liberal Democrats Labour did significantly better where they ran active 
free campaigns, although this was offset in part by the impact of Liberal Democrat free 
campaigning. The results suggest that this proved particularly potent against Labour but was 
slightly less effective against the Conservatives, who themselves improved their own vote 
against the Liberal Democrats in those seats where they engaged in more free campaigning.  
                                                
10  We would expect the residuals to be positively correlated. In those constituencies where one party is stronger than 
predicted by the model, at least one of the other parties must be weaker. This would result in large residual variances in 
both equations and makes the use of OLS regression techniques highly problematic. It therefore justifies our decision to 
use an SUR model.  
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Overall, the results in Tables A6 and A7 are slightly different from those found in the main 
analyses in Tables 5-6. However, it is worth reiterating that while the data used in Tables 5-6 
are representative, those in Tables A6 and A7 are less so, being selected solely on the basis 
of data availability. Notwithstanding, the central message of the article remains clear – free 
campaigning in 2010 had clear and independent electoral effects compared with candidate 
spending. This helps explain why the Conservatives did not perform better in 2010 despite of 
their substantial financial advantage. In other words, the level of candidate spending does 
not tell the whole story when examining campaign effectiveness. 
 
 
Table A6. SUR Models: The Impact Electoral of Free Campaigning and Candidate Spending (Short Campaign 
Spend)  
 
 Con-Lab Lib Dem-Lab Lib Dem-Con 
(n=98) b Sig. b Sig. b Sig. 
Constant -.05  -.45 * -.40 * 
Party Spending       
Labour Candidate Spending  -.02 * -.01 *    .00  
Conservative Candidate Spending  .01 * .01 * -.01 * 
Lib Dem Candidate Spending      .00  .01 *  .01 * 
Incumbency       
Labour Incumbent Candidate -.49 *   -.15   .34 * 
Conservative Incumbent Candidate .57 * .46 *   -.12  
Lib Dem Incumbent Candidate    -.01  .55 * .56 * 
Free Campaigning       
Labour     -.01  -.05    -.05  
Conservatives  .09 * .02  -.07 * 
Liberal Democrats      .07   .16 * .09 * 
R2  .85  .87  .64 
RMSE  .04  .04  .03 
 
Note 1: * p < 0.05 
Note 2: Con-Lab/LD-Lab: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(1) = 48.229, Pr = 0.0000. Dependent variables: 
Conservative-Labour vote share ratio 2010; Liberal Democrat-Labour vote share ratio 2010 
Note 3: LD/Con: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(1) = 30.038, Pr = 0.0000. Dependent variables: Liberal Democrat-
Conservative vote share ratio 2010; (Labour-Conservative vote share ratio 2010 identical to Con-Lab above and not reported) 
 
Table A7: SUR Models: The Impact Electoral of Free Campaigning and Candidate Spending (Short + Long 
Campaign Spend)  
 
 Con-Lab Lib Dem-Lab Lib Dem-Con 
(n=98) b Sig. b Sig. b Sig. 
Constant 0.30 *   -0.15  -0.40 * 
Party Spending       
Labour Candidate Spending  -0.03 * -0.03 *    0.00  
Conservative Candidate Spending  0.02 * 0.01 * -0.01 * 
Lib Dem Candidate Spending     -0.00  0.02 *  0.02 * 
Incumbency       
Labour Incumbent Candidate -0.72 *   -0.37 *  0.35 * 
Conservative Incumbent Candidate 0.65 * 0.43 *   -0.22 * 
Lib Dem Incumbent Candidate    -0.03  0.39 * 0.42 * 
Free Campaigning       
Labour     -0.09   -0.10 *   -0.01  
Conservatives  0.13 * 0.06  -0.07 * 
Liberal Democrats      0.13 *  0.19 * 0.06 * 
R2  0.82  0.85  0.68 
RMSE  0.04  0.04  0.03 
 
Note 1: * p < 0.05 
Note 2: Con-Lab/LD-Lab: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2 (1) = 59.479, Pr = 0.0000. Dependent variables: 
Conservative-Labour vote share ratio 2010; Liberal Democrat-Labour vote share ratio 2010 
Note 3: LD/Con: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(1) = 30.600, Pr = 0.0000. Dependent variables: Liberal Democrat-
Conservative vote share ratio 2010; (Labour-Conservative vote share ratio 2010 identical to Con-Lab above and not reported) 
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